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ISRAEL AT A CROSSROADS BETWEEN 
CwIc DIEMocRAcY AND JEWISH 
ZEALOTOCRACY 
ILAN PAPPE 
Mainstream Zionism (now comprising both Labor and Likud) is in- 
creasingly being challenged by the Right and Left. Post-Zionism has 
exposed the intellectualfallacies underlying traditional Zionism's at- 
tempt o combine thnic segregation with an open society, but it is the 
moral and ideological substitute offered by neo-Zionism, opting for 
ethnic segregation as an ultimate goal, that is mounting the realpolit- 
ical challenge. This article argues that while mainstream Zionists will 
delineate the space of a future Israel (by drawing the borders in a 
settlement with the Palestinians), the neo-Zionists will cast the ideolog- 
ical content into this space (by defining the identity and orientation 
of Israeli society). 
THE VICTORY OF EHUD BARAK in the May 1999 Israeli general election was 
hailed locally and internationally as the return of the Jewish state to the 
peace track. As the international media were quick to note, the final stage in 
the long road begun in Oslo was at hand. And yet, thus far, we have wit- 
nessed the conclusion of another version of the Wye accord, the Sharm al- 
Shaykh agreement, and preliminary negotiations on how to negotiate the 
final stages. In short, for all the dramatic announcements and sanguine inter- 
pretations, there has been very little progress. 
But more significant, and on the face of it quite surprising, is the virtual 
absence of internal debate in Israel at this "moment of truth" in the state's 
history. As the last phase in the negotiations supposedly gets underway, the 
debate that several years ago was so heated as to result in the assassination 
of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin has totally subsided. The Israeli government 
called upon to make this final peace is based on a large majority of Jewish 
members of the Knesset, and even the opposition accepts with few reserva- 
tions the basic outlines of the settlement likely to be offered to the Palestini- 
ans. From Peace Now on the Left o Gush Emmunim on the Right, there is a 
wide consensus on the nature of the conflict's solution. 
What is clear is that the old dichotomy between Labor and Likud no 
longer serves as an appropriate indicator of the nature of the internal Israeli 
debate on the crucial issues of national concern and particularly onthe solu- 
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tion of the Palestine question. Indeed, Labor (the hegemonic representation 
of Zionism from 1882 until its fall from power in the 1977 elections) and 
Likud (inheritor of the alternative, more ethnocentric and segregative variant 
of Zionism known as Revisionism that rose to challenge Labor Zionism as of 
1922) can be said to have coalesced into one major ideological stream. For 
despite the bitter antagonism that has separated them historically, and de- 
spite Labor's loss at the polls in 1977, it is Labor's vision that has prevailed 
over Revisionism's commitment tototal sovereignty over the whole of his- 
torical Palestine. It is Labor's vision, in which Likud has essentially acqui- 
esced, that has remained the principal prism through which the political 
center and professional e ites in Israel view the Israel/Palestine r ality. For 
the purposes of this article, we shall call this now-shared approach main- 
stream Zionism.1 
THE IDEOLOGICAL STREAMS 
Despite the convergence of the two megaparties into one stream, Israel, 
not unlike societies in the Balkans, remains very much a society torn by ide- 
ology. The leading ideological outlook represented by mainstream Zionism 
is challenged by two opposing streams: post-Zionism and neo-Zionism. Itis 
our purpose here to try to assess the sites and contours of the ideological 
debate underway since the last elections, its present balance of power, and 
implications for the future, not only on the state of Israel, but for the future of 
the Palestine question. 
From the Left, mainstream Zionism has been challenged since the 1980s 
by post-Zionism. This movement represents a cultural view that strongly crit- 
icizes Zionist policy and conduct before and during 1948, accepts many of 
the claims made by the Palestinians concerning 1948 itself, and envisions a
non-Jewish state in Israel as the best solution for the country's internal and 
external predicaments. As such, it represents a point of view acceptable to 
large numbers of Palestinian citizens in Israel. Indeed, whether it can ever 
become a meaningful political alternative depends largely on its ability to 
form a lasting political alliance with Israel's Palestinian ational minority. 
This alliance has not been formed as yet, and thus we cannot now talk about 
post-Zionism as a political challenge. The post-Zionist success so far has 
been in legitimizing hitherto taboo topics of great relevance to the present 
debate in Israel: the nature of Zionism, Israel's moral conduct in 1948, the 
refugee problem, policies toward Sephardic Jews (henceforth Mizrahim), 
and so on.2 More significant for the future will be its influence in the univer- 
sities and, more importantly, in the educational system, as will be discussed 
later in this article. 
The main political challenge to traditional Zionism comes from the Right, 
from a fundamentalist Zionism that Uri Ram has termed "neo-Zionism."3 
Neo-Zionism is a violent and extreme interpretation of Zionism. It existed as 
a marginal variant of Zionism both in the Labor and Revisionist camps and 
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was nourished in the teaching centers controlled by the religious Zionist 
Hapoel Hamizrachi (which became the National Religious Party, Mafdal). It 
burst forth as an official alternative after the 1967 war, pushed forward by 
expansionists among the Labor movement, leaders of the newly established 
Likud, and leading rabbis. In the 1980s, neo-Zionism widened its constitu- 
ency by forming alliances with the settlers in the occupied territories and 
with deprived and marginalized sectors of society. It is an uneasy alliance 
comprising expansionist nationalists, ultraorthodox rabbis, and ethnic spiri- 
tual leaders of the Mizrahi Jews, all presenting themselves as champions of 
the underprivileged Mizrahim. As an electorate, the Mizrahim until recently 
supported this alliance, but today have a far more complicated and sophisti- 
cated view that defies placement on the ideological map we are trying to 
draw. Quite probably, the Mizrahim are divided, very much like the rest of 
the Jewish community inIsrael, among the three ideological streams. 
The ideological debate in Israel involves a struggle over the collective 
memory and the past, the present, and the vision of the future. The debate 
over the past primarily involves the challenge to Labor Zionism's version of 
history mounted by post-Zionist scholars. It is here that post-Zionism has 
made its mark, having won an important following in Israeli academia and 
centers of cultural production, and-despite the fact hat every known histo- 
rian of the traditional Zionist camp has been recruited to refute post-Zionist 
theses-it has won wide legitimacy in the West and therefore in large seg- 
ments of Israeli society. The battle continues, its acuteness and indeed acri- 
mony undimmed because of its connection to the policies of the present and 
posture of the future. That the post-Zionists will ultimately win-indeed have 
already largely won-is no longer in doubt. Nonetheless, as I have addressed 
this battle over the past in earlier articles in this journal,4 we shall focus the 
discussion here on the remaining areas of contest: the present and the future. 
MAINSTREAM ZIomsM AND DRAWH4G THE POST-OSLO MAP 
While post-Zionism has impressive support in academia, and to a certain 
extent in the press and other cultural media, its vision of a secular, demo- 
cratic non-Zionist Israel (or Israel and Palestine as a unitary state) has but a 
marginal following in Israeli Jewish politics.5 In contrast, while traditional 
Zionism has limped unconvincingly into the new century as a scholarly in- 
terpretation fPalestine's past, it remains the major factor in shaping the 
Jewish perception of the present. 
The mainstream Zionist view has been translated into practical terms in 
the Oslo agreement or, more precisely, in the Israeli nterpretation of Oslo. 
The first part of this position is that pre-1967 Israel is not negotiable; hence 
the future of the refugees or Israel's role in creating the refugee problem are 
excluded from the negotiating table. Another aspect of the ban on pre-1967 
Israel is the categorical refusal to include Israeli Palestinians in any Israeli- 
Palestinian dialogue on the future. 
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Thus, for Zionism's mainstream, the geographical space of the Israeli-Pal- 
estinian conflict is confined to the areas occupied by Israel in 1967, apart 
from East Jerusalem and its environs and most of the territory controlled by 
the settlers. This is the space in which the permanent, not temporary, solu- 
tion of the question will eventually be implemented. The formula, involving 
Israeli overall control and some functions handled by the Palestinians, is a 
hybrid between two old Israeli "peace" plans presented in the 1970s: the 
Yigal Allon plan and the one offered by Moshe Dayan. Allon sought a territo- 
rial compromise with the Jordanians based on the demographic distribution 
in the territories. Dayan wanted to keep all the land but to divide the func- 
tions of authority between Israel and Jordan, with Israel holding mainly se- 
curity functions in the West Bank and the Jordanians keeping the others. A 
combination of these approaches, with the Palestinians replacing the 
Hashimites as partners, is the basis of the permanent settlement proposals 
offered by Labor and Likud in the post-Oslo reality. 
This is a shared vision. Labor and Likud, this combined ideological move- 
ment, likewise share the vision of its implementation. Like all the agreements 
since the conclusion of Oslo, it will be a dictated solution. The notion of 
dictation enjoys wide support among the Jewish population.6 Indeed, 
Likud's victory at the polls in 1996 showed that he majority of Jewish voters 
are willing to impose an even harsher version of the Oslo reality on the 
Palestinians: Netanyahu's fall from power had noth- 
Netanyahu's fall had ing to do with reservations about this policy, that in 
nothing to do with many ways Barak promises to imitate. Even though 
reservations about Likud did not join the new government, Barak's prin- 
dictating to the cipal negotiators (retired generals such as Vilnai, 
Palestinians, a policy that Yatom, Peled, and Stauber) and his government's 
in many ways Barak composition promise a similar approach. 
promises to imitate. Oslo is attractive for the Israelis because it appeals 
to the political center. Immediately after the 1996 Is- 
raeli elections, Yossi Beilin, a leading figure on the Labor's left wing, com- 
mented that he believed Labor and Likud could find a common ground for 
peacemaking.7 And indeed, Beilin, together with Michael Eytan, considered 
to be on the right of the Likud, hammered out a document hat showed, even 
then, the extent of the overlap between the two parties. Despite their posi- 
tions on opposite ends of the spectrum in their espective parties, they found 
it quite easy to formulate a document hat could serve as the basis for a per- 
manent settlement to be dictated to the Palestinians.8 In it, almost all the 
settlements were to remain under Israeli control and sovereignty; Jerusalem 
would remain a "single unified city" under Israeli sovereignty; the Jordan 
Valley would be a "special security zone"; and Israel would control border 
crossings. No refugee return would be permitted into sovereign Israel, and 
limits on refugee ntry into the Palestinian entity would be discussed.during 
final status talks. The document left open the possibility of a semblance of 
"statehood" in the areas-less than 55 percent of the West Bank and 60 per- 
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cent of the Gaza Strip-that would remain under Palestinian control, 
although even under the most liberal interpretation what would be offered 
was far from normal statehood. 
This vision has an economic dimension too, which cuts across national 
boundaries. Part of this vision is the introduction fa capitalist and free mar- 
ket economy both in Israel and in Palestine. Under the Paris Protocol, the 
economic component of Oslo signed in May 1994,9 Israel and Palestine were 
to form one economic unit. This can be seen in the way the customs outfits 
are connected and the way a joint taxation policy is being exercised. Further- 
more, the agreement grants Israel the right o veto any development scheme 
put forward by the Palestinian Authority (PA). Israel's monetary and currency 
exchanges play a commanding role in the Palestinian economy, and Israel 
totally dominates the PA's foreign trade and even industry. 
The introduction fthe Israeli version of a capitalist economy into the PA 
areas can only have a disastrous effect. With the absence of democratic struc- 
tures and a very low GDP, the integration ffered by Oslo can only turn the 
PA areas into the slums of Israel. An excellent example can already be seen 
in Erez, the buffer zone between Israel and the Gaza Strip. There, the Israelis, 
with the blessing of the Americans and the European Union, opened an in- 
dustrial park. Let the name not mislead the readers: it is a production line 
where all the workers are Palestinians and all the employers are Israelis ben- 
efiting from the very low wages they pay the workers. Israel has plans for 
similar parks on the border between Jordan and the West Bank. This is why 
Israeli ndustrialists consider themselves part of the peace camp. The other 
aspect of the capitalization of the peace process, of course, is the benefit 
derived from such economic transactions by a small number of Palestinians. 
While this double burden of economic misery and lack of a satisfactory 
political solution could lead to a Palestinian attempt o revolt against the 
post-Oslo reality, itis difficult tosee why the Israelis hould make an effort to 
alter the current situation. For the majority of Israeli Jews, this peace is based 
on an unbeatable logic, one that was many times pronounced by the late 
prime minister Rabin. According to this logic, the Palestinians were in a dis- 
mal situation before Oslo and are now offered an improvement. Not a very 
impressive one but, still, one that can be defined as N+1-"N" being the pre- 
vious situation, and "1" being Gaza, Jericho, and Ramallah covered with Pal- 
estinian flags and policed by Palestinian security services. This is peace for 
most Israelis, provided there is no terror or bombs. For most Israelis, peace is 
their daily security, and this has been enhanced by the Oslo process. 
NEo-ZIONISTS AND THE MAKaNG OF AN ISRAEI ZEALOTOCRACY 
With this geopolitical vision, even the ultraorthodox parties of Shas and 
Agudat Israel are willing to go along. But the vision of the future is not just a 
matter of defining borders or containing Palestinian ational aspirations. Itis 
also a matter of identity and the essence of a society. And here we encounter 
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the neo-Zionist vision, shared by the settler community, supporters of 
Mafdal, the ultraorthodox parties, and a new secular Right (including a new 
party of Russian immigrants called Yisrael Beitainu, or Israel Is Our Home) 
closely associated financially and ideologically with the New Right in the 
United States. 
Unlike the post-Zionists, he neo-Zionist alliance has representation i  the 
new government formed after the 1999 elections. They have six ministries, 
although compared to Netanyahu's government they have of course lost 
power. They can join the Barak government because they shifted from an 
interest in territory and political borders to sociocultural questions. The mini- 
state offered by Barak to the Palestinians frightens them, but they accept 
their inability to put forward an alternative.'0 
In elementary sociological terms, neo-Zionists thrive on the margin be- 
tween decreased external tensions and rising internal ones. Post-Oslo Israel 
is multiethnic, multicultural, nd deeply divided on issues of culture, law, 
morality, and education. The divisions do not reflect clear positions, but 
rather, confusion and insecurity. The various groups constituting Israeli soci- 
ety increasingly tend to stress their particular identity at the expense of the 
state's identity. A change in the electoral aw before the 1996 elections en- 
couraged such trends: voters could now vote separately for the prime minis- 
ter and the Knesset, allowing them to vote "realistically" for the premiership 
and more "emotionally" for the party representing their particular interests. 
And indeed, the 1996 elections made clear that Ethiopians, Russians, North 
Africans, ecular Tel Avivians, Palestinian Israelis, and so on believed that 
their particular interests could best be served in sec- 
Neo-Ziontsm's growing tarian voting. The 1999 elections only strengthened 
power is assisted by the this trend. 
confusion arising from Neo-Zionism's greatest attraction for the Jewish 
post-Zionism's majority in Israel is its simplicity. Ironically, its grow- 
deconstruction of ing power is partly and inadvertently assisted by the 
traditional Zionism. confusion arising from post-Zionism's deconstruction 
of traditional Zionism. Neo-Zionism conveys confi- 
dence, not confusion, about the future. Its main tactic is to present itself as 
having the key for unifying the disintegrated and polarized Israeli society- 
the key being a clear version of Judaism as a national movement, something 
the articulators ofLabor Zionism never succeeded in doing. The neo-Zionists 
can thus pretend to be the unifying force bridging the gap between conflict- 
ing interpretations f Judaism both as a religion and as a national movement. 
While the post-Zionist cholars aw the fractured reality as indicative of the 
need to make Israel a state for all its citizens, the neo-Zionists proposed a 
Jewish religious and nationalist cement hat would prevent further f agmen- 
tation and disintegration. 
Four parallel processes are taking place that forge this neo-Zionist option: 
(1) the fanatization of the national religious groups (whose strongholds are 
in the settlements and in the wide network of state-funded yeshiva centers); 
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(2) the nationalization or Zionization of the previously anti-Zionist ul- 
traorthodox Jews; (3) the ethnic insulation of segments of the Mizrahim 
caught in the geographical and social margins of society; and (4) Israel's 
rapid integration i to capitalist globalization-which adds to the alliance an 
intellectual neoconservative c nter, a la the New Right. The groups emerging 
from these four processes share one vision: an ethnic religious theocracy as 
the best means of confronting Israel's external and domestic problems. The 
dominant force among these groups are religious leaders, be they rabbis, 
magicians, healers, politicians, or educators. This elite shares an extremely 
pejorative perception of secular Israeli Jews. According to a recent book by 
Sephi Rachlevski exposing these views," this alliance sees the secular Jews 
as the "Messiah's Donkey": they did their job in carrying the Jews back to the 
Holy Land, but they are obsolete now and can be treated like non-Jews. 
(Non-Jews are like beasts that can be utilized and exploited, at times feared, 
but always inferior.) As this book shows, medieval Jewish thought, devel- 
oped to counteract and provide solace in the face of a deeply hostile gentile 
environment, has been recycled here as the basis for a modern racist ideol- 
ogy positing a clear exclusion/inclusion axis-a future Israel without secular 
Jews and non-Jews. 
This concept has been formulated by the national religious thinkers 
(mainly rabbis). It is presented as Zionism, not Judaism. Itis connected to the 
Zionist concept of fulfillment, hagshama, which in its old interpretation 
meant only one thing: settling the land. At first, neo-Zionism saw settlement 
of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the Golan as the ultimate act of patriotism. 
But settlement is now fading due to the Oslo accords. Fulfillment has come 
to mean strictly observing the Jewish laws and struggling a ainst raditional 
(secular) Zionism in the realm of the judiciary and legislature; its main target 
is Israel's High Court because of its attempts to safeguard the public sphere 
from religious impositions. 
The neo-Zionists' view of the past is nationalistic and romantic. Israel of 
the Second Temple era is the glorious past that is to be reconstructed. Their 
resemblance to the BJP in India is striking. Both groups wish to demolish the 
past of a few hundred years for the sake of a distant past of a few thousand 
years. Hence, the neo-Zionists take seriously the idea of rebuilding a Third 
Temple to replace the Haram al-Sharif, and they prepare cadres of would-be 
priests to serve there when the time comes. Where the neo-Zionists differ 
among themselves is on whether to achieve their goal by blowing up the 
two mosques on the Mount or wait for divine intervention to clear the way.12 
Their greatest success to date, apart from their leading role in the Netan- 
yahu government, was their long control of Israel's educational system.13 In
the new Barak government, they share the office with Meretz, a traditional 
Zionist party. This dual control over the educational system by a leftist minis- 
ter and a neo-Zionist deputy is less absurd than it seems and reflects the 
current confusion about Israel's past, as traditional Zionists fight a rear-guard 
(albeit largely losing) battle in the academy against post-Zionist challengers. 
This content downloaded from 144.173.152.98 on Fri, 28 Mar 2014 10:32:44 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
40 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES 
During the Ministry of Education's long period under neo-Zionist control, 
which has now temporarily ended, several educational kits (textbooks, cur- 
ricula, etc.) were produced that continue to circulate, particularly inschools 
within the neo-Zionist population centers. One item in the kit, for example, 
is a textbook chronicling the state's first fifty ears'4 that hardly mentions 
Palestinians. They are not mentioned with regard to the 1948 war, nor as 
Israeli citizens under military rule until 1966, nor as an occupied population 
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since 1967. The existence of Palestinian 
refugees is something the readers of this book will not know about. They 
will only be aware of the existence of Palestinian terrorism, which emerged 
somewhere in the 1960s for unknown reasons.15 
Just before Netanyahu's government fell at the end of 1998, a new plan 
was announced aimed at "linking pupils more closely with the army." 16This 
Spartan/Prussian scheme was to prepare children from kindergarten through 
high school for a "military environment and values: coping with situations of 
pressure and developing leadership skills in a battlefield." Army maneuvers 
and military indoctrination were to be integral parts of the educational sys- 
tem along with enriched lessons on Zionism and Erez Israel studies. Specific 
programs for each of the last three years of high school aimed at "increasing 
motivation for the IDF" and strengthening "commitment to homeland." 17
Though elements of this type of program always existed in Israeli schools, 
they constituted a marginal part of school life and their content was designed 
by traditional Zionists. The kits formulated according to the neo-Zionist in- 
terpretation, onthe other hand, would be bound to shape the pupils' vision 
of the future in such a way that would be difficult toundo even by the most 
persuasive post-Zionist lecturer-if they were even lucky enough to hear dif- 
ferent opinions in the future. 
Such elements are no longer official policy due to the change in govern- 
ment, but they continue to be available for teachers alongside a new set of 
kits issued under the new government inSeptember 1999.18 The alternative 
educational kits mainly include new textbooks that have received front-page 
coverage in the New York Times because of their willingness to incorporate 
a Palestinian perspective in their historical presentation a d cast some doubt 
on the moral rightness of Zionist actions.'9 These books, like the TV docu- 
mentary "Tekumma,"20 were written by scholars influenced by the post-Zi- 
onist critique and therefore include some reevaluation of the past, but they 
are still basically faithful tothe traditional Zionist narrative; their inclusion of 
Palestinian elements is primarily toexplain why Zionism was and continues 
to be opposed. The approach of the authors of the new books is well ex- 
pressed by Avnet Ben-Amos, a member of a committee preparing the books: 
In the past the teaching of history [in Israel] was dominated 
by a version that claimed that we [the Israelis] had an un- 
questionable right o the land to which we returned after 
2,000 years of exile and that we reached an empty land. 
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Nowadays we cannot divorce the teaching of history from 
the debate inside academia and in the professional litera- 
ture. We have to insert he Palestinian version to the story of 
Israel's history, so that he pupils will know that here is an- 
other group that was affected by Zionism and the [1948] 
war of independence.2' 
The lack of clarity in the educational system arising from the coexistence 
of diametrically opposite educational materials-some shaped by neo-Zion- 
ists and others influenced by post-Zionists-is compounded by another fac- 
tor: the minister of education himself. Yossi Sarid accepts some of the 
alternative postures uggested by post-Zionist cholars and seems to dislike 
the neo-Zionist kits. However, he allows only a modicum of criticism to 
enter the curriculum. As a traditional Zionist, he has no clear objective of 
orienting the educational system toward a new look at the Palestinians or 
human and civic rights issues. His deputy, however, is determined to intro- 
duce more Jewish content-both national and religious-into the system. 
This uneasy coexistence of two contradictory approaches to Zionist his- 
tory is yet another manifestation f the extent to which the ideological 
center's view of the past has been undermined and the impact of this on the 
present. One can either challenge fundamentally the truisms of Zionism in 
the name of democracy and liberalism, or one can remain committed to 
these truisms at the expense of democracy and liberalism. The Labor move- 
ment wanted to square the circle and find away of reconciling the contradic- 
tions by concluding peace and turning Israel into a democratic and liberal 
entity. As it turned out, it is impossible to do both. The realization that it must 
be one or the other is at the heart of the post-Zionist position, but it is also 
the motivating force behind neo-Zionism. 
So a balance sheet of present Israel reads as follows. In the political field, 
the center is dominated by the two main parties of traditional Zionism, 
closely connected to the professional e ites in the country. This center sees 
no need to make decisions about Israel's future development apart from the 
realm of Israeli-Palestinian relations: what parts of the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip (the tendency is to give up at least half) are to be given to an 
autonomous Palestinian Authority hat could be called a state if necessary. 
The rest of the area will be settled by Jews and annexed to Israel, with Jeru- 
salem remaining united and the capital of Israel. The refugee problem will 
remain unsolved or at least postponed to the very distant future. 
This political center's vision of the past makes it blind to the link between 
ethnic and group identity on the one hand and economic poverty and social 
deprivation on the other. It refuses to be concerned about (or even accept) 
the fragmented nature of society. Its main concern is to enhance Israel's nu- 
clear capability and high-tech prosperity as the guarantees for Israel's future 
survivability. In contrast, he post-Zionist reading of the past renders a just 
solution to the refugee problem as a far better guarantee for security. 
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The domestic scene is thus effectively abandoned, and this is where neo- 
Zionism as an option thrives. With their programs replacing government 
services (providing financial aid, child care, and schools with extended 
hours) in deprived areas, the neo-Zionists are steadily increasing their elec- 
torate. While they adopted the traditional Zionist discourse of "one people" 
that excludes the Palestinian citizens of Israel, they gave it new meaning by 
excluding as well purely secular Jews, foreign workers (estimated at about 
300,000), and non-Jews (estimated as another 300,000, mainly from the for- 
mer Soviet Union and Ethiopia). There are, of course, internal power strug- 
gles among the various components of the neo-Zionist interpretation. 
However, the common ground is wide, and thus far the coalition has not 
broken down. On the contrary, ithas gained momentum and force. 
FuTu1u DIRECTIONS 
Israel at fifty isa society at several crossroads. One, obvious and well re- 
ported, involves decisions about how much of the occupied territories must 
be given up in order to move on with the peace process. But this is a small 
junction, and if it is crossed Israel will be confronted with far more meaning- 
ful and confusing crossroads. The most important of these is the ethnic-civic 
dichotomy of Israel. It is, as mentioned, already clear that mainstream Zion- 
ism's option of reconciling the contradictions through peace cannot suc- 
ceed. The "post-Zionist" scholars, with the help of the media, have already 
hinted at the other choices. One is an ethnic state that allows no compromise 
with the Palestinians and denies equal rights to Israel's Arabs and social jus- 
tice to Israel's deprived populations. This is an ethnicity closely associated 
with an inflexible interpretation f Judaism-an ethnocracy or, indeed, a 
zealotocracy. As far as can be judged, this option is also fixated on the free 
market economy and capitalism already widespread in Israel. The other op- 
tion is a civic society accepting the historical verdict of the post-Zionist 
scholars and connecting the wrongs of the past to the positive possibilities in 
the future. These include a comprehensive peace in Palestine, a genuine de- 
mocracy without discrimination, a d a more egalitarian society able to offer 
hope to deprived groups and wronged minorities. This could be a formula 
not just for Israel proper but preferably (albeit in a more distant future) for a 
new political entity between the Jordan and Mediterranean-a secular and 
democratic Palestine. 
Between these two options, the neo-Zionists so far have the upper hand. 
They have the advantage of being disassociated in the public mind from the 
deeds of the past. Hence, unlike the traditional Zionists, they have no qualms 
about describing the unpleasant chapters in the history of Zionism and 
Israel: the massacres and expulsion of Palestinians (which they advocate im- 
plicitly today) and the discrimination against Sephardic and Orthodox Jews. 
Unlike the traditional Zionists, they are able to offer a clear future, not a fu- 
ture torn between secular democracy and ethnic theocracy but a future built 
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on an unquestionable preference for the latter. In short, unlike the traditional 
Zionists, neo-Zionists are not occupied with trying to square the circle by 
presenting a reality based on oxymorons such as "enlightened occupation," 
"pure arms," liberal ethnocracy," or "ethnic democracy."22 They are also 
helped by a confused Israeli academia, where traditional Zionists, despite 
the undermining oftheir official "version" of history, continue to control the 
major required introductory courses in the human sciences and are still 
struggling tokeep the illusion of a society capable of being both ethnic and 
civic. 
Three factors can affect hese admittedly gloomy prospects. One is a 
bolder definition of objectives by all those who count themselves as belong- 
ing to the civic and democratic camp in Israel. Thus far, the objectives have 
not been clarified, and such clarification would inevitably reopen the ques- 
tion of what kind of entity could replace the Jewish nation-state inorder to 
safeguard both Israeli and Palestinian human and civic rights. On these is- 
sues, there is more confusion than determination i  the post-Zionist camp. 
This is why I use the term "post-Zionism" advisedly, because, for better or 
for worse, this approach is not totally liberated from the Zionist ideology 
with all its limitations and problematics. 
The second factor is willingness on the Palestinian side to engage openly 
on a democratic basis in a search for a joint solution. Post-Zionism isa Jew- 
ish phenomenon, but it is a transitional phase out of Zionism. But into what? 
It seems pointless to define the final destination without first exploring Pales- 
tinian aspirations. Can a civic and democratic state serve both peoples? Are 
both peoples' goals best served within a federated structure that could satisfy 
national identities? Or is it necessary to have two states (if the latter is even 
possible in a meaningful way, given the post-Oslo reality)? 
The third factor is the position to be taken by the United States and Eu- 
rope, for without pressure on Israel there is little hope for change from 
within. Sanctions or boycotts could be counterproductive, creating an even 
more entrenched neo-Zionist approach, but the West needs to redefine 
agents of progress, stabilization, and human welfare in the region. Israel's 
distorted self- and external image as the "only democracy in the Middle East" 
has to be challenged by Americans and Europeans by pointing to persistent 
patterns of behavior ever since 1948. A continuous Western portrayal of 
Israel as a Western democratic island in an Arab wilderness has been one of 
the major obstacles faced by those in Israel working for the establishment of
a humanistic and civic society that benefits everyone living in Israel and 
Palestine. 
NOTES 
1. When referring to Labor and Likud, 
I refer not only to their platforms but also 
to the attitudes oftheir electorate asman- 
ifested in opinion polls and the political 
discourse of individuals regarding them- 
selves as belonging to the "silent major- 
ity" or "mainstream" Israel. 
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2. Even the present manipulation of 
Holocaust memory has become a legiti- 
mate topic for debate, not only in 
academia but in the public discourse. A 
measure of the change is the fact that the 
Knesset for the first ime has agreed to 
debate proposals to transform Israel from 
a Jewish state to a state for all its citizens. 
This has no chance of being endorsed, 
but in the past it was forbidden by law to 
present such bills. Now, without even 
changing the law, they have been al- 
lowed on the Knesset's agenda. 
3. Uri Ram, "Post-Nationalist Pasts: 
The Case of Israel," Social Science His- 
tory 22, no. 4 (Summer 1989), pp. 513-45. 
4. See Ilan Pappe, "Post-Zionist Cri- 
tique on Israel and the Palestinians," parts 
1-3, JPS 26, no. 2 (Winter 1997), pp. 
29-41; 26, no. 3 (Spring 1997), pp. 37-43; 
26, no. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 60-69. 
5. In the 1996 elections, 6,000 Jews 
voted for Hadash, which represented 
such an option. About 12,000 voted for 
Hadash in the 1999 elections. 
6. After Rabin's assassination, the 
"Peace Index," which measures general 
support for the peace process, reached its 
zenith, 73.1%, but after a series of terrorist 
attacks in Israeli urban centers, it declined 
to 58.1%, its nadir. It has since remained 
steady, between 58% and 62%. This index 
has been tracked by all of the daily press 
since 1994. 
7. Ha'aretz, 4 June 1996 [in Hebrew]. 
8. The document was finalized on 22 
January 1997. SeeJPS 26, no. 3 (Spring 
1997), pp. 160-62. 
9. For the official text of the Paris Pro- 
tocol, seeJPS 23, no. 4 (Summer 1994), 
pp. 103-18. 
10. See, for instance, the issue of Na- 
tiv 2, no. 67 (March 1999) [in Hebrew], 
which is devoted to the question of the 
Palestinian state. 
11. The Messiah's Donkey (Tel Aviv: 
Yedi'ot Aharonot, 1997). 
12. Ehud Sprinzak, The Ascendance of 
Israel's Radical Right (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991). 
13. The neo-Zionists had control of 
the Ministry of Education in the last unity 
government, 1984-88; in the Shamir gov- 
ernment, 1989-92; and again in the Ne- 
tanyahu government, 1996-99. 
14. The Ministry of Education, Israel's 
Jubilee (Jerusalem, 1998). The book was 
the subject of Associated Press bulletins 
when it came out, and a book review on 
it can be found at the Hebron Institute for 
Political and Religious Studies Web site at 
http://www.hebron.com. 
15. Yedi'ot Aharonot, 19 April 1999 
[in Hebrew]. For an analysis of Israeli 
textbooks and curricula, see Eli Podeh, 
The Portrayal of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
in Israeli History and Civics Textbooks, 
1953-95 (Jerusalem: Truman Institute, 
1997) [in Hebrew]. 
16. Interview ith the Ministry of Edu- 
cation director general, Yedi'ot Aharonot, 
9 September 1998 [in Hebrew]. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Under the Israeli system, teachers 
can choose from several approved kits 
for classroom use. 
19. New York Times, 14 August 1999. 
Throughout September 1999, the Israeli 
press was full of debate on the books 
mentioned in this report by Ethan Bron- 
ner, particularly a book entitled The 
Twentieth Century, by Eyal Naveh, com- 
missioned by the Ministry of Education in 
1999. 
20. See my review in JPS 27, no. 4 
(Summer 1998), pp. 99-105. 
21. HaAretz, 29 March 1998 [in 
Hebrew]. 
22. These attitudes have ben analyzed 
by Oren Yiftachel, The Research on the 
Arab Minority in Israel and Its Relations 
with the Jewish Majority: Survey and 
Analysis (Givat Haviva: Institute for Peace 
Research, 1993) [in Hebrew]. 
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